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1. The Chilean crisis of 1982–1983 is considered one of the worst in the
twentieth century (see Kehoe and Prescott, 2002).
2. In this study, we use output per working-age population to analyze growth
processes in the Chilean economy and a 2 percent annual rate as trend. Output
per working-age population (that is, the population from sixteen to sixty-four
years of age) is the appropriate indicator of per capita output in the context of the
theoretical economy we use, in which the entire working-age population is ca-
pable of working. The 2 percent rate used as a proxy for trend growth corresponds
to average annual growth in this variable from 1960–2002 in Chile.
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From 1984 to 1998, the Chilean economy grew at a rate of 5.4
percent per capita, putting it among the world’s most successful
economies in the past twenty years. This performance can undoubtedly
be attributed to the market-oriented structural reforms that took
place in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. This route was far from
easy, however. The period of substantial growth was preceded by a
profound crisis in the early 1980s that led to an accumulated decline
in per capita output of around 20 percent for 1982–1983.1 Chile then
grew steadily, and it regained its trend level in 1990.2 In the years396 Raphael Bergoeing, Felipe Morandé, and Facundo Piguillem
that followed, the growth rate held steady at around 6 percent, bringing
per capita output 30 percent above its 1980 trend level by 1998.
In the past few years, however, the Chilean economy has
experienced a sharp drop in its growth rate. From 1998 to 2002, the
per capita growth rate averaged a mere 0.63 percent per year. Different
hypotheses have been put forth to explain this period of stagnating
growth. In particular, analysts have mentioned external factors
associated with the decline in the terms of trade and reduced access to
external capital flows that started with the Asian crisis. The recent
recession affecting the world economy—which deteriorated further after
the September 11 terrorist attack—is said to have contributed to
worsening the outlook for the terms of trade and dampening investors’
appetite for risk. Others have argued that this fall could be the result
of the excessively restrictive monetary policy stance applied by the
Central Bank in mid-1998 to reduce the impacts of the Asian crisis,
which were just becoming apparent at the time. The effects of this
policy, combined with the direct impact of the Asian crisis itself, may
have proved more lasting and harder to turn around than originally
foreseen, even with the openly expansionary monetary policy that has
been applied for several quarters since.
Still others argue that the country’s difficulties with returning to
growth rates like those of the past decade go beyond the explanations
of a normal cycle. These analysts suggest that recent results reveal a
decline in the economy’s potential for growing at more than 3 to 4
percent annually. Furthermore, until very recently, the economy was
unable to create new jobs at rates comparable to those previously
observed. The combined phenomena of stagnant growth and low job
creation coincided not only with an external scenario that is extremely
complex for emerging economies, but also with a range of policy
actions, including legal reforms, that affect production costs. Among
these, two stand out: the 30 percent increase in the minimum wage
implemented between 1998 and 2000 and the so-called labor code
reform. The latter was passed in October 2001, but only after two
years of parliamentary debate that left the impression that the reform
would increase labor hiring costs by much more than it actually did.
Other relevant policy changes include reforms to reduce tax evasion,
which were passed toward the end of 2000, and reforms to reduce the
tax burden on individuals but gradually increase the burden on
companies, which were approved in mid-2001. In an opposite direction,
reforms were passed in late 2001 to liberalize the capital market;
these should reduce investment and capital costs in the future.397 Labor Market Distortions, Employment, and Growth
The present article focuses on the third of these hypotheses, that
is, that the decline in growth and job creation are linked to changing
production costs, mainly associated with more expensive labor. Taking
Bergoeing and others (2002) and Bergoeing and Morandé (2002) as
our starting point, we analyze the role of factor accumulation and the
efficiency with which these factors were used over the past twenty
years in Chile, placing output fluctuations in the context of a simple
neoclassical growth model. The analysis shows that the fall in
employment has been the primary determinant of the observed decline
in growth in recent years. This contrasts sharply with the crisis in
the early 1980s and the recovery and strong economic growth phase
that followed and lasted through 1998, when the efficiency of factor
use was the main engine driving economic activity.
1. GROWTH ACCOUNTING
In the context of the neoclassical model, lower growth may be the
result of a decline in labor factor accumulation, stemming from changes
in implicit or explicit taxes that make it more expensive to hire labor
and thus increase production costs. Kehoe and Prescott (2002) show
that most crises during the twentieth century were the consequence
of drops in the efficiency of factor use or labor contribution. In Chile
from 1981 to 1998, the main source of growth was the efficiency with
which labor and capital were used; since then, fluctuations in activity
levels have resulted fundamentally from changes in employment.
To determine the contribution of factor accumulation and the
efficiency of factor use to the change in output per working-age
population, we break down the change in the latter by changes in
total factor productivity (TFP), the capital-to-output ratio, and hours
worked per person of working age. This breakdown is based on a
Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, that is,
1
tt t t YA K L
α− α = ,
where Yt is output, Kt is capital, Lt is total hours worked, and At is
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3. Appendix A provides a complete description of the data used and sources.398 Raphael Bergoeing, Felipe Morandé, and Facundo Piguillem
When TFP grows at a constant rate, that is, when At = Ag(1–α )t,
the neoclassical growth model is characterized by a unique balanced
growth path in which output and capital per worker grow at the same
constant rate, g – 1. In this study, we analyze the behavior of output
relative to this trend. The 2 percent trend in output per working-age
person used for Chile also fits the United States data very well
throughout most of the twentieth century. Kehoe and Prescott (2002)
argue that this trend growth represents evidence that the world stock
of useable knowledge has grown smoothly over time and is not country
specific: countries differ in their institutional structures.
Labor and output series are available directly from national
accounts. To obtain At, however, we must choose a value for the capital
share in output, α , and generate aggregate capital series, Kt.
Information from national accounts indicates that the labor
compensation share of Chile’s output is almost 0.5. This, in a competitive
context, corresponds to 1 – α , so the capital share is 0.5. This fraction
is stable over time and similar to many developing countries. Labor’s
share is much higher in developed countries, with α  fluctuating around
0.3. Gollin (2002) shows that if we correct for labor’s share in developing
countries to allow for the underestimation of independent workers,
then labor’s contribution rises significantly and tends toward levels
observed in developed countries—that is, 0.7. A second reason for using
this figure and not the information from national accounts is that in
the latter case, the growth model predicts a marginal productivity for
capital that is unrealistically high.4 The sensitivity exercises included
in appendix B show that the results of the study would not be
substantially different if we assumed a value of α  close to that arising
from the national accounts (for example, 0.45). The fraction of output
attributed to the labor factor only affects the distribution of changes in
output between TFP and capital; it does not affect the labor factor’s
contribution, which is the main element behind the behavior of output
in 1998–2002. We therefore assume that α  = 0.3, particularly given
that this paper centers precisely on the changes to production costs
stemming from legal reforms (namely, labor laws).
Taking logarithms in the production function, we have
1
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4. If α  = 0.45, for example, the before-tax rate of return on capital would aver-
age 23 percent from 1960 to 2002. With α  = 0.30, however, this rate is 15 percent.399 Labor Market Distortions, Employment, and Growth
where Lt/Nt is the number of hours available for work per person of
working age.5 We then break this expression down to separate out
changes in real output per working-age population for period t and








































The first term on the right-hand side of the equation represents
the contribution of TFP to growth; the second term is the
contribution from changes in the capital-output ratio; and the third
term is the contribution from changes in hours worked per person
of working age. The empirical evidence reveals that in the long
term, both the capital-output ratio and employment remain
constant. In the short term, however, factor accumulation can be
very important to growth.
Table 1 provides the breakdown of output per working-age
population (henceforth per capita output) for the Chilean economy
from 1980 to 2002. These data reveal that employment was the most
relevant factor behind the level of economic activity in 1998–2002,
which contrasts with the period of sustained growth from 1983 to
1998.6 Employment explains an average annual decline in per capita
output of around 2.31 percent in the more recent period.7 Per capita
5. We obtain Nt by multiplying the population aged sixteen to sixty-four years
by the number of hours available for work in the year, assuming a hundred hours
per week for fifty-two weeks; Lt corresponds to the number of people working in
Chile for the average number of hours worked in Greater Santiago. This break-
down is based on Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
6. During the crisis in the early 1980s, employment and TFP accounted for
similar percentage drops in per capita output.
7. We are using a logarithmic approximation of growth. This allows us to carry
out an additive decomposition of growth factors.400 Raphael Bergoeing, Felipe Morandé, and Facundo Piguillem
Table 1. Growth Accounting in Chile, 1981–2002
Total change Contribution Contribution Contribution
Period in Y/N  of TFP  of K/Y of L/N
1981–1983 –10.93 –7.81 5.26 –8.38
1983–1998 4.76 3.36 –0.34 1.73
1998–2002 0.63 1.51 1.42 –2.31
Source: Authors’ calculations.
output rose, however, by an average of 0.63 percent per year during
this period because TFP was 1.51 percent and the capital-output ratio
contributed 1.42 percent. In previous years, TPF appears to have
been the main determinant of growth.
Alternative calculations for the growth accounting confirm our main
finding, namely, that the drop in per capita output in 1998–2002 is
mostly explained by a fall in the contribution of labor (see table 2). This
result is robust to different specification for capital and labor: our results
remain qualitatively unchanged if we use capital utilization instead of
capital stock or the number of workers instead of hours worked.
Table 2. Growth Accounting in Chile, 1998–2002: Robustness
to Alternative Measures
Total change Contribution Contribution Contribution
Indicator in Y/N of PTF of K/Y of L/N
Base case 0.63 1.51 1.42 –2.31
Number of people 0.63 1.04 1.06 –1.61
Capital utilization 0.63 1.29 0.81 –1.61
and number of people
Source: Authors’ calculations.
2. DETERMINISTIC GROWTH MODEL
This section uses a simple deterministic version of the
neoclassical growth model, which considers a single good that is401 Labor Market Distortions, Employment, and Growth
consumed or used in investment. The representative household





max log 1 log ,





tt t t t t t t t t
CN L




 βγ + − γ − 
+− = − τ + − τ− δ +
∑
where Ct is consumption, Nt – Lt is leisure, rt is the real return on
capital before taxes, wt is real wages, τ t
l is the labor tax rate, τ t
k is the
tax on net capital minus depreciation, and Tt is a transfer that the
government pays the consumer. Moreover, β∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor, and δ  is the depreciation rate.
The representative firm solves the problem,
1
t max  ttt tt t t AK L rK wL
α− α Π= − − .
The government’s problem is to balance its budget, that is,
()
lk
tt t t t t t Tw L rK =τ +τ − δ . (2)
Finally, the equilibrium requires market clearing:
()
1
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+ +− − δ = = . (3)
The consumer’s problem is characterized by a condition requiring
intertemporal optimization for consumption and an intratemporal
consumer-leisure optimization condition. These are represented,
respectively, by the following equations:























The problem of firms is characterized by conditions of equality
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Equations (2) through (7) are necessary and sufficient to
completely characterize the equilibrium. To simulate the model,
we must parameterize our theoretical economy. The parametric
specification is given by β  = 0.98, δ  = 0.05, and γ = 0.28. We specified
the discount factor and the depreciation rate using the values
typically assigned in the literature. The parameter for labor disutility,
γ, was calibrated according to equation (8), assuming zero labor tax
and considering an average value for the 1960–1998 period consistent
with data for consumption, employment, and output. This parameter
thus implicitly includes distortions associated with the labor market,
and it is consistent with the values reported by McGrattan (1994)
for the United States and Bergoeing and Soto (in this volume) for
Chile. To evaluate the plausibility of an increase in distortions in
the consumption-leisure decision associated with labor market
policies, we calibrate the labor tax for equation (8) so as to replicate
the behavior of employment in 1998–2002 in Chile. The capital tax



















 +− τ − δ 
. (9)
Finally, Ct corresponds to total private and governmental
consumption and exports.
3. SIMULATIONS
We used the growth model described above to carry out five
simulation exercises, which serve as the basis for analyzing whether
changes in factor prices resulting from distortionary tax policies
were relevant to Chile’s recent economic growth performance. Each
exercise consists of simulating the model from 1980 to infinity using
actual values for TFP and different values for taxes, associated
with unexpected reforms.8 We then report the impacts of TFP, the403 Labor Market Distortions, Employment, and Growth
capital-output ratio, and the ratio of employment to the working-age
population on growth for the 1980–2002 period, in a manner
consistent with the growth accounting breakdown presented in the
previous section. The first simulation consists of solving the
equilibrium with a capital tax of 49 percent for the entire period
under analysis. The second exercise takes into consideration the
income tax reforms implemented in Chile in the mid-1980s, which
is simulated as a fall in the capital tax from 49 percent to 18 percent
in 1987.9 These values were calibrated for the periods 1960–1980
and 1987–2002, respectively, based on the consumption-investment
decision implicit in the data—that is, using equation (9). Because
the decline in the capital tax rate is unexpected, the equilibrium of
the simulation remains unchanged for the first six years. The actual
income tax rates in Chile during this period underwent a reduction
from 45 percent to 10 percent in 1985 and then an increase to 15
percent in 1991. The capital tax rates calibrated from the data using
equation (9), while they represent the set of distortions implicit in
the consumption data, are surprisingly similar to the rates actually
observed during this period.
The third simulation is perhaps the most interesting for the
purposes of this paper. It assumes that the debate about changes to
labor legislation that started in 1999 and the significant hike in the
minimum wage increased the likelihood of labor becoming more
expensive, which is expressed as a hiring tax in the model. This tax
is calibrated so as to replicate the decline in employment’s
contribution to growth as observed in the previous four years and is
maintained from then on.
The two final exercises consist of calibrating the capital tax and
TFP, respectively, for the 1998–2002 period so as to replicate the
observed decline in employment (thereby assuming away the hiring
tax of the third exercise).
Table 3 presents our results. The simulation of an economy
without capital tax reform significantly underestimates output
growth from 1983 to 1998 and overestimates it for the next four
years. The main reason for the underestimation is that the drop in
the capital-output ratio and employment is overestimated. The
opposite occurs in the last four years of the sample period: the
8. From 2003 on, we assume that TFP grows at the same average rate as it did
in 1960–2002.
9. Although the reform started in 1985, it wasn’t fully implemented until 1989.404 Raphael Bergoeing, Felipe Morandé, and Facundo Piguillem
model underestimates the increase in capital and the drop in the
fraction of total hours worked. The fall in employment is so dramatic
that output growth in this period is overestimated by about 1.9 percent.
Table 3. Growth accounting in Chile: Simulations
with ααααα  = 0.30a
Period and source Simulation Simulation Simulation Simulation Simulation
of change in Y/N Data 12345
1981–1983
Total change in Y/N –10.94 –9.20 –9.20 –9.20 –9.20 –9.20
Contribution of TFP –7.81 –7.81 –7.81 –7.81 –7.81 –7.81
Contribution of K/Y 5.25 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60
Contribution of L/N –8.38 –6.98 –6.98 –6.98 –6.98 –6.98
1983–1998
Total change in Y/N 4.76 2.80 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05
Contribution of TFP 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36
Contribution of K/Y –0.34 –1.12 –0.33 –0.33 –0.33 –0.33
Contribution of L/N 1.73 0.56 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
1998–2002
Total change in Y/N 0.63 2.53 1.81 0.74 0.20 –6.72
Contribution of TFP 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 –8.02
Contribution of K/Y 1.42 1.11 1.28 1.54 0.99 3.60
Contribution of L/N –2.31 –0.72 –0.98 –2.31 –2.31 –2.31
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Simulation 1, our base case, considers a capital tax and no reforms. Simulation 2 includes a capital tax
reduction to 18 percent as of 1987. Simulation 3 adds to simulation 2 a labor tax of 6.17 percent as of 1999.
Simulation 4 adds to simulation 2 a capital tax increase to 35.16 percent as of 1999. Simulation 5 replicates the
exercise in simulation 4, but TFP in 1998–2002 is calibrated to replicate the observed fall in employment (spe-
cifically, TFP falls by 5.6 percent annually).
Incorporating the capital tax reform significantly improves the
results for the 1983–1998 period. This time, capital falls almost as much
as in the data, and the underestimation of employment is only 0.7
percentage points. For the 1998–2002 period, however, the increase in
output is overestimated, mainly because the model doesn’t capture
the fall observed in employment.
Consequently, the third and fourth simulations apply increases
in taxes on employment and capital, respectively, to replicate the
behavior observed in employment. These exercises test the
hypothesis that higher production costs may be responsible for the405 Labor Market Distortions, Employment, and Growth
lower growth observed in Chile in the recent past. The simulations
demonstrate that increasing the labor tax from zero to 6.17 percent
or the capital tax from 18.0 to 35.2 percent can produce this effect.
The second tax, however, worsens the overall prediction while
improving the approximation of output performance. In particular,
the unreformed model from 1999 overestimates the fall in the capital
contribution, so that a higher capital tax worsens the model
simulation even further.
Our final simulation imposed a TFP during the 1998–2002 period
so as to replicate the observed fall in employment. The rationale for
this exercise is that TFP may be mismeasured as a result of
unobserved shocks to the economy. The simulation shows that a
fall in TFP like the one considered generates a deep fall in output
per capita, similar to that observed in 1981–1983, whereas the data
show that output per worker actually increased during the period,
albeit slightly.
The labor tax option thus appears to be the most plausible
explanation for what occurred in Chile after 1998. This labor tax
could imply that economic agents perceived an increase in hiring
costs as a result of both the large increase in the minimum wage
between 1998 and 2000 and the debate surrounding labor reforms.10
This perception of an increase in the relative price of labor was
apparently enough to generate a significant drop in short-term
growth in Chile.11 Labor markets were also reformed in Chile in
1992, when an increase in the required severance pay raised the
cost of firing. Labor did not fall, however, the way it did in the last
four years of the sample period. The macroeconomic scenario was
dramatically different, as the economy was growing at a much faster
rate and capital inflows were booming.
We modeled the increased cost of hiring labor as the result of
several labor market distortions associated with the observed
debate on the labor code and the actual increases in the minimum
wage that occurred in Chile in 1999–2002. Our simulations fully
10. Cowan and others (2003) also document the effect of the minimum wage
on employment in 1999 and 2000, using a very different approach. In addition,
Martínez, Morales, and Valdés (2001) show that a structural break in the labor
demand occurred in Chile in 2000. That is, given the aggregate production and
relative prices, the Chilean economy demanded less employment at the end of
2000 than in previous years. This downward displacement in labor demand could
be explained by an increase in hiring costs, as mentioned above.
11. Beyer (2001) finds that the expected cost of layoffs associated with the
new labor structure would rise by about 16 percent.406 Raphael Bergoeing, Felipe Morandé, and Facundo Piguillem
incorporate the higher cost of labor as of 1999, however. When we
simulated this policy distortion as being perceived to happen some
periods in the future, the increases in the cost of labor needed to
replicate the observed fall in employment were smaller than if the
reform was fully implemented in 1999. This simulation captures
the timing of the discussion generated in Chile during the period
and the uncertainty with respect to the period in which the
authority would implement the labor reform. Our results show
that the labor tax required to match the fall in employment drops
as the expected date of implementation moves farther into the
future. Specifically, if the reform is expected to be implemented in
1999, a 6.17 percent tax is required to replicate the actual fall in
employment; the required tax falls to 5.8 percent when the reform
is expected to occur in 2000, 5.58 percent for 2001, and 5.21 percent
for 2002. In a dynamic general equilibrium model with no frictions,
agents substitute intertemporally to optimize. Since the reform is
expected to become binding in the future, firms decide to
temporarily increase their hiring of labor until their labor costs
effectively increase.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium paths of employment for alternative
scenarios with respect to the date when the reform is expected to be
fully in place. The plotted lines illustrate the actual data for the
proportion of hours worked between 1998 and 2002, the simulated
Figure 1. Future Taxes and the Fall in Employment, 1998–2002
Proportion of hours worked
Source: Authors’ calculations.407 Labor Market Distortions, Employment, and Growth
path in the economy without labor taxes, and the employment paths
calibrated for labor reforms implemented at alternative dates in the
future. If the reform is expected to be binding in the future, the
simulated economies with the required taxes match the average fall
in employment for the period, but it occurs later that actually
happened. Moreover, as discussed above, the further away the
expected reform, the lower is the required increase in the cost of
labor needed to match the fall in employment.
These results crucially depend on the assumption of fully flexible
labor markets until the reform is effectively implemented. Another
possibility is that labor markets have frictions—as a result of firing
costs, for instance—so that even when the reform is expected several
years in the future, the fall in employment is observed in the present.
This possibility is not considered here since our simulations in which
the reform is assumed to be expected immediately and markets are
fully flexible (table 3) generate the same equilibrium as that obtained
when the reforms are expected in the future and rigidities are binding
in the present.
Our model simplifies reality on several dimensions, one of which is
potentially relevant to the analysis. By using a closed economy, we do
not explicitly take into account the effect of changes in the terms of
trade or other external variables that may be relevant in the case of a
small, open economy like Chile. These variables mainly affect what is
referred to here as TFP, that is, the residual that remains after
considering the accumulation of labor and capital (in other words, all
other input factors).12 The data for 1998–2002 show, however, that the
decline in employment, rather than TFP, was the dominant element
behind trends in per capita output. Moreover, our exercises include
actual TFP, thus capturing the impact of the terms of trade on output.
In this context, the relation between growth and employment is not
dependent on the assumption of a closed economy. Finally, when we
generated the observed fall in employment based exclusively on a drop
in TFP (the fifth simulation of table 3), the induced changes in per
capita output and the capital-to-output ratio were inconsistent with
the observed patterns: the simulation generates a fall in either variable,
whereas the data show that both increased.
12. Appendix C demonstrates that our closed-economy model captures fluctuations
in the terms of trade through the TFP parameter, At. Comparing 1983–1998 with
1999–20002 shows that the contribution of TFP to per capita growth fell by almost 50
percent. This fall is undoubtedly the result of the lower terms of trade since 1998.408 Raphael Bergoeing, Felipe Morandé, and Facundo Piguillem
4. CONCLUSIONS
This study suggests that the recent decline in economic activity
in Chile may have been the result of the increased cost of hiring
labor perceived by economic agents, here simulated as a labor tax of
6.17 percent. This perception may have stemmed from the combination
of the substantive increase in the minimum wage between 1998 and
2000 and the debate that started in 1999 over the labor code reform.
The final bill passed by Congress in October 2001 did include provisions
that increased the cost of hiring.
Although establishing a connection between the recently observed
fall in employment in Chile and the perception of an increase in the
hiring cost of labor requires further analysis, this study shows that
small expected changes in relative input prices may generate a large
substitution of inputs, causing a detriment to short-term economic
growth. If the expected increases in input prices remain over time,
the fall in economic activity may reduce long-run growth.409 Labor Market Distortions, Employment, and Growth
APPENDIX A
Data Sources and Description
For the 1981–2002 period, the gross domestic product series is
taken from the Central Bank of Chile. The investment series is from
gross capital formation and inventory changes in the International
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. Capital was
generated using the investment series, corrected for the assumed
depreciation rate. The working-age population corresponds to people
from sixteen to sixty-four years of age, as reported by the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. Employment series are from the
National Statistics Bureau (INE). Finally, total hours worked were
calculated using employment per average hours worked in urban
Santiago, according to results from the employment and
unemployment survey carried out by the Universidad de Chile’s
Economics Department.
For the 1998–2002 robustness simulations in table 2, we use
employment from INE and capital utilization from the Central Bank
of Chile.410 Raphael Bergoeing, Felipe Morandé, and Facundo Piguillem
APPENDIX B
Alternative Simulation
Table A1 provides the results of growth accounting for the data
and for each of the five simulation exercises presented in table 3,
assuming α  = 0.45. Simulations were carried out using β  = 0.98,
δ  = 0.05, and γ = 0.33. Capital tax rates, calibrated in equation (9),
were in this case τ t
k = 0.71 until 1986 and τ t
k = 0.53 thereafter. The
labor tax that replicates employment’s contribution (fall) in 1999–
2002 is τ t
l = 0.0469.
Table A1. Growth Accounting in Chile: Simulations
with ααααα  = 0.45a
Period and source Simulation Simulation Simulation Simulation Simulation
of change in Y/N Data 12345
1981–1983
Total change in Y/N –10.94 –10.15 –10.15 –10.15 –10.15 –10.15
Contribution of TFP –12.58 –12.58 –12.58 –12.58 –12.58 –12.58
Contribution of K/Y 10.03 10.20 10.20 10.20 10.20 10.20
Contribution of L/N –8.38 –7.76 –7.76 –7.76 –7.76 –7.76
1983–1998
Total change in Y/N 4.76 2.08 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.86
Contribution of TFP 3.66 3.66 3.66 3.66 3.66 3.66
Contribution of K/Y –0.64 –2.19 –0.99 –0.99 –0.99 –0.99
Contribution of L/N 1.73 0.60 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18
1998–2002
Total change in Y/N 0.63 1.12 1.46 0.80 0.26 –8.02
Contribution of TFP 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 –13.60
Contribution of K/Y 2.71 1.66 2.53 2.88 2.34 7.90
Contribution of L/N –2.31 –1.04 –1.29 –2.31 –2.31 –2.31
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Simulation 1, our base case, considers a capital tax and no reforms. Simulation 2 includes a capital tax
reduction to 53 percent as of 1987. Simulation 3 adds to simulation 2 a labor tax of 4.69 percent as of 1999.
Simulation 4 adds to simulation 2 a capital tax increase to 60.35 percent as of 1999. Simulation 5 replicates the
exercise in simulation 4, but TFP in 1998–2002 is calibrated to replicate the observed fall in employment
(specifically, TFP falls by 5.6 percent annually).
As with the case reported in the text (α  = 0.30), the simulations
without tax reforms (columns 1 and 2 in the table) considerably
underestimate growth in output per person of working age during411 Labor Market Distortions, Employment, and Growth
the period of sustained growth and overestimate this output during
the period beginning in 1998. The capital tax reform that began in
1987 allows us to accurately replicate the factor accumulation process
observed in the data. Finally, the labor tax rate necessary to replicate
actual employment trends from 1998–2002 is almost equal to the result
of the simulation exercise reported in table 3.
From a qualitative point of view, therefore, the results reported
in table A1 do not differ from those presented in table 3. The sole
difference lies in the relevance of capital and TFP in each case.
Nonetheless, α  = 0.45 is not only implausible from an empirical
perspective (see Gollin, 2002), but also suggests an annual before-tax
return on capital averaging 23 percent in 1960–2002. This rate of
return is too high.412 Raphael Bergoeing, Felipe Morandé, and Facundo Piguillem
APPENDIX C
Terms of Trade and TFP in a Closed-Economy Growth
Accounting
Assume a small open economy that produces two types of goods:
exportable and importable. The aggregate production function in terms
on importable goods would then be as follows:
11 MM X X MX X
tt t t t tt t YA K M L M P A K X L X
α− α α − α =+ , (C.1)
where KMt and LMt are employment and capital in the importable
sector and KXt and LXt are employment and capital in the exportable
sector. Pt
X is the relative price of exports and imports (terms of
trade), which is exogenously determined since the economy is
assumed to be small. To calculate TFP as in equation (1)—that is,
assuming that there is only one good—the actual production function
is given by equation (C.1). We thus obtain
; 1 1
11 1
M MT X MX X
tt t t t t t t
t
tt tt tt
Y A KM LM P A KX LX
A
KL KL KL
−α αα − α
α− α α− α α− α == + , (C.2)
where Kt = KMt + KXt is the aggregate capital stock measured in
terms of the importable good and Lt = LMt + LXt is total employment
expressed in hours of work. Equation (C.2) can then be presented as
MM XXX























α− α = .
Equation (C.3) shows that the changes in TFP estimated under
this assumption include not only the actual changes in the




t A ) , but also
the efficiency gains or losses stemming from input reallocations
(measured by
M
t w  and
X
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